PUSA

PUSA owns and operates exactly two public golf clubs in Kissimmee, FL (Remington and Kissimmee Bay) on 289 owned acres, generating $2.96M of FY2025 revenue. That revenue is not growing — it has now fallen three years running, from $3.55M (FY2023) to $3.30M (FY2024) to $2.96M (FY2025, -10.1% YoY) — and the business swung from a $386K profit in FY2023 to a -$3.68M net loss in FY2025, with operating margin at -148.6%. Management ties the FY2025 collapse to identifiable, partly one-time pressures: Remington Golf Club was fully closed for re-greening from May 17 to Oct 3, 2025, an above-average rainy Q1 (its seasonally busiest quarter) pressured play, and the renewed DTE maintenance contract reset to inflationary pricing (raised a further ~10% from Nov 2025). So the loss is not purely structural decay — but even normalized, this is a sub-$3M-revenue regional golf business, not a growth story.

The problem is price. At $4.05 the market cap is $82.0M against $2.96M of revenue — a P/S of 27.7x for a company whose top line is contracting. The post-IPO balance sheet is genuinely clean (the Feb-2025 Nasdaq IPO netted ~$10.6M, $2.46M of which repaid legacy related-party loans), leaving $28.7M cash, $32.7M equity and almost no debt (liabilities/equity 0.06x). But that balance sheet is the floor, not the upside: book value is roughly $1.61/share and net cash roughly $1.41/share, so the stock trades at ~2.5x book while the operating business burns cash (-$2.03M operating cash flow) and funds capex into its courses. You are paying an $82M enterprise valuation for assets carried at ~$33M.