OLB

OLB is a $4.5M nano-cap whose core merchant-services business is disintegrating, not building. Revenue has collapsed from $30.6M (FY2023) to $12.8M (FY2024) to $8.68M (FY2025) — a 72% two-year decline and -32.4% in the latest year — while the company has never earned a profit in the five years shown, with cumulative retained-earnings deficit of -$74.4M. The narrowing net loss to -$5.87M looks like progress until you see it's driven by shrinking the business, not fixing unit economics: gross margin is 0.7%, operating margin -59.5%, and net margin -67.7%. The MD&A touts eVance processing '$100,000,000 in gross transactions monthly,' but that headline volume converts to almost no gross profit — the company explicitly notes revenue from SecurePay transactions 'is limited.' This is a business that moves large payment volumes and keeps almost none of it.

The balance sheet is the disqualifier. Cash and equivalents are $15.8K — not a typo, fifteen thousand dollars — against $7.69M of current liabilities and only $1.05M of current assets, a ~$6.6M working-capital hole. Stockholders' equity of $4.61M is thin and, with -$1.33M operating cash flow, the company cannot self-fund. It has been plugging the gap by printing stock: shares outstanding rose 428% year-over-year, and the MD&A discloses ongoing unregistered issuances. At $0.36 the stock is already deep below NASDAQ's $1.00 minimum bid, so continued dilution and delisting risk compound each other — existing holders get diluted toward zero while the listing itself is in jeopardy.