TTEC

TTEC is a structurally declining contact-center/BPO operator whose equity is now a thin sliver sitting atop a heavily levered balance sheet. Revenue has fallen three straight years (from $2.46B in FY2023 to $2.14B in FY2025, -3.2% YoY) and the company has booked back-to-back losses (-$321M in FY2024, -$192M in FY2025). Stockholders' equity collapsed 57.9% to $113M while total liabilities sit at $1.39B — a 12.28x liabilities/equity ratio and a -170.5% ROE. The optically tiny ~$102M market cap and ~0.05x P/S are the classic equity-stub trap: enterprise value is dominated by the ~$905M drawn under the Credit Facility, so the business is not actually cheap once debt is counted.

The filing language makes the balance-sheet stress explicit and worsening. The November 2025 Tenth Amendment shrank the revolver from $1.2B to $1.05B (with further $25M cuts in April and July 2026), leaving only ~$95M of remaining borrowing capacity. Net leverage was 3.58x against a covenant that steps down toward 3.00x by Q3 2027 — a tightening box. Pricing escalates harshly: credit margins jump to 5.0% (base) / SOFR+6.0% after September 2026, plus a 1.5% extension fee if outstanding past October 1, 2026, so debt-service costs are set to rise just as the business shrinks. Tellingly, acquisitions and restricted payments are cut 100% and the dividend has been eliminated ($0 paid in FY2025 vs prior payments) — management is conserving every dollar for the lenders, not shareholders.