VRM

Vroom is no longer the ecommerce used-car retailer its history implies — that business was wound down. Post-Chapter 11 (emerged Jan 14, 2025, 1-for-5 conversion to ~5.16M shares), it is effectively UACC, a non-prime indirect auto lender servicing ~76,000 contracts / ~$950M principal, plus the CarStory analytics unit. The one-year-old capital structure, the discontinued top line (revenue tags read '—' for FY2024–25, so P/S is meaningless at 0.0), and management's explicit going-concern framing mean this is a special situation, not a normal equity you can underwrite on the numbers provided.

The trend line is the only bull case: net loss narrowed to -$53.0M (FY2025) from -$165M (FY2024) and -$365M (FY2023), fresh-start accounting reset stockholders' equity to a positive $164M, and operating cash flow swung to +$75.2M. But the balance sheet is fragile — just $35.4M cash against $366M long-term debt and 4.81x liabilities/equity — and the financing actions in the MD&A scream distress: $22.5M of Vroom Automotive preferred at SOFR + 8.25%/9.00%, a $10.5M related-party delayed-draw note maturing Nov 2026 (fully drawn), and $10M of 5% convertible notes to the executive chair's fund. A lender that must raise capital at high-single-digit spreads over SOFR from insiders is not funding growth; it is funding survival.